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Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the
framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations
playing against each other following the rules that are periodically changing. By combining Floquet
theory and the concept of quasi-stationary distributions, we reveal existence of metastable time-
periodic states in the evolution of finite game-driven populations. The evolutionary Floquet states
correspond to time-periodic probability flows in the strategy space which cannot be resolved within
the mean-field framework. The lifetime of metastable Floquet states increases with the size N of
populations so that they become attractors in the limit N →∞.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 05.45.-a
Introduction. The evolutionary dynamics of an animal
group is tied to the reproductive activity of its mem-
bers, a complex process which involves courtship ritu-
als and sharing of parental care [1]. Within the game
theory framework, the sex conflict over parental invest-
ment was formalized by Dawkins in his famous “Battle
of Sexes” (BoS) [2], illustrated in Fig. 1. In this game
two opposite-sex members of the group play against each
other. Each player can use two behavioral strategies.
Entries in the payoff matrix, bss′ , quantify the reward
received by a female which used a strategy s ∈ {1, 2} af-
ter she has played against a male which used a strategy
s′ ∈ {1, 2}. Entries as′s define the reward of the male.
A number of observations have shown that mating
strategies and preferences of many species are not con-
stant in time but season-dependent [3]. For example,
courtship srituals of the males of Carolina anole lizards
(Anolis carolinensis), as well as mate selection criteria of
the females of the species, are periodically changing dur-
ing the year [4]. Even the amount of different types of
muscle fibers that control the vibrations of a red throat
fan (dewlap) - which males employ during the courtship -
is a season dependent characteristic [5]. Currently, there
is no agreement between the ecologists on the role this
seasonal plasticity plays in determining the evolution di-
rection of the species [6].
We address this problem within the BoS framework
by allowing the payoffs to periodically vary in time, see
Fig. 1. Our goal is to investigate how these modulations
influence the game-driven evolutionary dynamics. Here,
we first apply the concept of quasi-stationary distribu-
tions in absorbing Markov chains [7] to a stochastic evo-
lutionary dynamics of finite populations and define the
notion of evolutionary metastable states. Then, by em-
ploying the Floquet theory [8, 9], we generalize the notion
of metastable states [10–12] to periodically modulated
FIG. 1: (color online) “Battle of Sexes” with seasonal varia-
tions. A female of Carolina anole lizards can be either coy and
prefer an arduous courtship, to be sure that a mate is ready
to contribute to a parental care, or fast, and thus not being
much concerned about parental care of offspring. A male can
be either faithful and ready to assure the female partner, by
performing a long courtship, that he is a faithful potential
husband, or philanderer and prefer to shorten the courtship
stage. Depending on the strategies, s (s′), played by the fe-
male (male), the female (male) gets payoff bss′ (as′s). Both
females and males are season-constrained in their strategies
and preferences, which is modeled via time-periodic modula-
tions of the payoffs.
game-driven evolutionary dynamics. We show that in
big but finite populations, the metastable Floquet states
survive over extremely long (as compared to the period of
modulations) timescales. We argue that, in the limit of
infinitely big populations, these states become attractors
while still evading the mean-field description.
Model. Finite size of animal populations favors a
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2stochastic approach to evolutionary dynamics. Although
the convergence to the deterministic mean-field dynam-
ics is typically guaranteed in the limit N → ∞ [8, 9],
the stochastic dynamics of large but finite populations
can still be very different from the mean-field picture
[6, 16–18]. Here we adapt the game-oriented version of
the Moran process [19], introduced in Ref. [5] and gen-
eralized to two-player games in Ref. [6].
Players A (males) and B (females) form two popula-
tions, each one of a fixed size N and with two avail-
able strategies, s = {1, 2}, see Fig. 1. Game payoffs are
time-periodic functions, css′(t) = css′(t + T ), c = {a, b},
and can be represented as sums of stationary and zero-
mean time-periodic components, css′(t) = c¯ss′ + c˜ss′(t),
〈c˜ss′(t)〉T = 0. The time starting from t = 0 is incre-
mented by 4t = T/M after each round. After M rounds
the payoffs return to their initial values. The state of
the populations after the m-th round is fully specified by
the number of players playing the first strategy, i (males)
and j (females), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N . A detailed description of
the corresponding stochastic process is given in Supple-
mental Material. It can also be shown that, in the limit
N → ∞ [6], the dynamics of the variables x = i/N and
y = j/N is defined by the adjusted replicator equations
[3]; see Refs. [8, 11].
For a finite N , the state of the system can be expressed
as a N × N matrix p with elements p(i, j), which are
the probabilities to find two populations in the states i
and j, respectively. Round-to-round dynamics can be
evaluated by multiplying the state p with the transi-
tion fourth-order tensor S, with elements S(i, j, i′, j′) [3].
By using the bijection k = (N − 1)j + i, we can un-
fold the probability matrix p(i, j) into the vector p˜(k),
k = 0, ..., N2, and the tensor S(i, j, i′, j′) into the matrix
S˜(k, l). This reduces the problem to a Markov chain [22],
p˜m+1 = S˜
m
p˜m, where m is the number of the round to
be played. The four states (i = {0, N}, j = {0, N}) are
absorbing states because the transition rates leading out
of them equal zero [3]. The absorbing states are attrac-
tors of the dynamics for any finite N , and the finite-size
fluctuations will eventually drive a population to one of
them [18, 23]. This would imply a fixation, so that only
one strategy survived in each of now monomorphic pop-
ulations [6, 18].
We are interested in the dynamics before the fixa-
tion, so we merge the four states into a single absorb-
ing state by summing the corresponding incoming rates.
The boundary states, (i = {0, N}, j ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1})
and (i ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, j = {0, N}), can also be merged
into this absorbing super-state: Once the population gets
to the boundary, it will only move towards one of the
two nearest absorbing states. By labeling the absorb-
ing super-state with index k = 0, we end up with a
(L+ 1)× (L+ 1) matrix
S˜m =
[
1 %m0
0 Q˜m,
]
(1)
where L = (N − 1)2, %m0 is a vector of the incoming
transition probabilities of the absorbing super-state, 0 is
a L×1 zero vector, and Q˜m is a L×L reduced transition
matrix.
With Eq. (1), we arrive at the setup used by Darroch
and Seneta to formulate the concept of quasi-stationary
distributions [7]. There is the normalized right eigenvec-
tor of the reduced transition matrix Q˜m with the maxi-
mum eigenvalue λ [24]. By using the inverse bijection, we
can transform this vector into a two-dimensional proba-
bility density function (pdf), i.e., a state, d, with maxi-
mal mean absorption time. This state is the most resis-
tant to the wash-out by the finite-size fluctuations and it
remains near invariant, up to a uniform rescaling, under
the action of the tensor S. This is the metastable state
of the evolutionary process.
Stationary case. As an example, we consider a game
with payoffs a11, a22, b12 and b21 equal 1, and payoffs
−1 for the rest of strategies [25]. Figure 2 presents the
numerically obtained metastable states of the game. We
use two methods, the direct diagonalization of the re-
duced transition matrix, which is stationary in this case,
Q˜m ≡ Q˜, and preconditioned stochastic sampling [3].
For N = 200 we find an agreement between the results
of the two methods. The means of the metastable state,
x¯ =
N−1∑
i,j=1
i
N
· d(i, j); y¯ =
N−1∑
i,j=1
j
N
· d(i, j), (2)
coincide with the Nash equilibrium [26] for any N .
However, the actual dynamics is determined by the
metastable limit cycle encircling the equilibrium (this
could be seen by performing short-run stochastic sim-
ulations); see Fig. 2. Within the Langevin-oriented
approach to the dynamics of finite populations [6, 10],
the appearance of the metastable limit cycle can be in-
terpreted as a stochastic Hopf bifurcation [28] (see also
Ref. [29] for another interpretation). In the limit N →∞
the cycle collapses to the Nash equilibrium. Note, how-
ever, that the convergence to this limit is slow, as indi-
cated by the width of the pdf for N = 400.
Case of modulated payoffs. By adding time-
modulations to the model, we find that the mean-field
dynamics does not exhibit substantial changes. For
the choice (t) = a˜11(t) = b˜22(t) = f cos(ωt) with
ω = 2pi/T (all other payoffs held stationary) we ob-
served a period-one limit cycle localized near the Nash
equilibrium of the stationary case, see Figs. 3(a,b).
It collapses to a set of adiabatic Nash equlibria,{
xNE() =
2−
4− , yNE() =
2
4+
}
in the limit ω → 0.
3FIG. 2: (color online) Metastable states of the stationary BoS game. In the mean-filed limit N =∞, a trajectory spirals towards
a fixed point
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
, the Nash equilibrium of the game. For the finite N , metastable states are specified by their quasi-stationary
probability density functions (pdf’s) (3d plots). For N = 200 the pdf combines the results of the direct diagonalization of the
39 601 × 39 601 matrix Q˜ (left half of the pdf, this procedure was also used to obtain the function for N = 100) and of the
preconditioned stochastic sampling (right part of the pdf, this procedure was also used to obtain the function for N = 400) [3].
The baseline fitness w = 0.3 (other parameters are given in the text).
The dynamics of a finite N population is different. The
stochastic evolution of a trajectory in the (i, j)-space, ini-
tiated away from the absorbing boundary, can be divided
into two stages. At first the trajectory relaxes towards
a metastable state. The timescale of this process is de-
fined by the mixing time tmix(N) [30], which in this case
has to be calculated now for the quasi -stationary state.
Then the trajectory wiggles around the metastable state
until the fluctuations drive it to the absorbing boundary.
Following the random-walk approximation, the mean ab-
sorption time tabs(N), called “mean fixation time” [2, 11]
in the evolutionary context, seemingly should also scale
as N . However, this estimate neglects the presence
of the inner attractive manifold and the fact that the
noise strength decreases upon approaching the absorb-
ing boundary. In fact, the absorption time scales super-
linearly with N [31]. The lifetime of the metastable state
is restricted to the time interval [tmix(N), tabs(N)], whose
length scales as tabs(N)[1− tmix(N)/tabs(N)] ∼ tabs(N).
For ω = 0.1 [32], the stochastic simulations reveal
a metastable state which is distinctively different from
the limit cycle produced by the mean-field equations,
see Fig. 3b. There is a conflict between the evolution
of means, described by the adjusted replicator equa-
tions, and the results of the stochastic dynamics. The
conflict can be resolved with the concept of the quasi-
stationary distribution. Namely, the transition matrices,
Eq. (1), are round-specific now and form a set {S˜m},
m = 1, · · · ,M . The propagator over the time interval
[0, t], 0 < t < T , is the product U˜(t) =
∏Mt
m′=1 S˜
m′ with
Mt = t/4t. All the propagators, including the period-
one propagator U˜(T ), have the same structure as the
super-matrix in Eq. (1). We define the metastable state
d(T ) as the the quasi-stationary distribution of U˜(T ).
It is also a Floquet state [9] of the reduced propagator
U˜r(T ), which can be obtained by replacing the tran-
sition matrices S˜m
′
with the matrices Q˜m
′
or by sim-
ply cutting out the first line and column from the ma-
trix U˜(T ). The Floquet state is a time-periodic state,
d(t + T ) = d(t), which changes during one period of
modulations, see Fig. 4. The metastable state d(t) at
any instant of time t, 0 < t < T , can be obtained by act-
ing on the state d(0) with the reduced propagator U˜r(t).
The evolution of the means of the pdf d(t) (see Fig. 4a),
(x¯(t), y¯(t)), is close to the period-one limit cycle, see blue
dots on Fig. 3a. However, the Floquet state consists of
two peaks produced by the noised period-two limit cycle
(compare also the positions of the stroboscopic points
in Fig. 3b with the pdf for t = 0 in Fig. 4a). The
peak contributions balance each other thus reducing the
dynamics of the means to the vicinity of the the point(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. The lifetime of the state d(t) can be estimated
with the largest eigenvalue λT , 0 < λT < 1, of the ma-
trix U˜r(T ). To compare it with lifetimes of stationary
metastable states, we introduce the mean single-round
exponent, λ¯T = λ
1/M
T and define the mean lifetime as
tlife = 1/(1 − λ¯T ) [3]. Aside of the slow decay trend, we
found the effect of modulations not being strong. This
is in stark contrast to the structure of the metastable
states. Namely, while in the stationary limit the pdf d
is localized near the Nash equilibrium, at the maximal
distance from the absorbing boundaries, the metastable
Floquet state is localized near the absorbing boundary,
see Fig. 4. We also detect the increase of the boundary
localization with the increase of the population size be-
yond N = 200. This suggests that, in the limit N →∞,
the dynamics of the system is governed by a period-two
limit cycle localized near the absorbing boundary. The
boundary localization of the metastable attractor can be
interpreted as the presence of small fractions of mutants
[11], i.e. the players that are using strategies different
from that used by the majority of populations. The evo-
lutionary dynamics of the mutant fractions looks like a
repeating sequence of population bottlenecks [2, 33] yet
this only weakly affects fraction lifetimes [34] even in the
case of finite N .
4FIG. 3: (color online) Evolutionary dynamics governed by the
BoS game with modulated payoffs. (a) Period-one limit cy-
cles of the mean-field dynamics for ω = 0.1 (blue dash-dotted
line) and ω = 0.01 (red solid line) are localized near the Nash
equilibrium of the stationary game,
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
(arrows indicate
the direction of motion). In the limit ω → 0, the mean-field
attractor shrinks to the set of adiabatic Nash equlibria (black
dashed line). Mean position (•) of a finite-N metastable Flo-
quet state, (x¯(t), y¯(t)), Eq. (2), moves along the limit cycle
localized near the point
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
(the means are plotted at the
instants tn = nT/5, n = 0, .., 4); (b) A stochastic trajectory
(grey line) reveals the existence of a period-two limit cycle
[the period doubling can be resolved with stroboscopic points,
plotted at the instants 2nT (4) and (2n+ 1)T (♦)]. The tra-
jectory is initiated at the point marked with the open blue
square and ends up at the absorbing state (red cross at the
upper left corner). The trajectory of the mean of the finite-
N metastable Floquet state (•) is distinctively different from
the stochastic trajectory [note the change of scale as com-
pared to panel (a)]. The parameters are f = 0.5, N = 200,
and M = T/4t = 10N (corresponds to the driving frequency
ω = 0.1 in the mean-field limit) [32]. Other parameters as in
Fig. 2.
Conclusions. We presented a concept of metastable
Floquet states in game-driven populations when mate
selection preferences are periodically changing in time.
Here we combined the Floquet formalism with the con-
cept of quasi-stationary distributions to reveal the exis-
tence of complex, liquid-like nonequlibrium dynamics in
the strategy space which cannot be resolved within the
mean-field framework. Metastable Floquet states are not
restricted to the field of ecology studies but can emerge in
different periodically modulated systems with stochastic
event-driven dynamics. They may, for example, underlay
a gene expression in a single cell, which is modulated by
a circadian rhythm [38] and can provide new interpre-
tations of the Bose-Einstein condensation in ac-driven
atomic ensembles [39, 40].
[1] M. Andersson, Sexual Selection(Princeton Univ. Press.
Princeton, 1994).
[2] R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1976).
FIG. 4: (color online) Evolution of the metastable Floquet
state over one period of modulations. The pdfs obtained by
the direct diagonalization of the reduced period-one propaga-
tor for N = 200. The corresponding means (x¯(t), y¯(t)) are
shown on Fig. 3a (•). Plots for t = 0 (above the diagonal)
and t = T (below the diagonal) present the results of the
stochastic sampling.
[3] See Supplemental Material for more information.
[4] D. Crews, Science 189, 1059 (1975).
[5] M. M. Holmes, C. L. Bartrem, and J. Wade, Physiol. and
Behav. 91, 601 (2007).
[6] V. D. Jennions and M. Petrie, Biol. Rev. Cambridge Phi-
los Soc., 72 (2006).
[7] J. N. Darroch and E. Seneta, J. Appl. Prob. 2, 88 (1965).
[8] G. Floquet, Annales de l’E´cole Normale Supe´rieure 12,
47 (1883).
[9] M. Grifoni and P. Ha¨nggi, Phys. Rep. 304, 229 (1998).
[10] G. Biroli and J. Kurchan, Phys. Rev. E 64, 016101
(2001).
[11] S. Rulands, T. Reichenbach, and E. Frey, J. Stat. Mech.
L01003 (2011).
[12] M. Assaf and M. Mobilia, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 188701
(2012).
[13] J. Hofbauer and K. H. Schlag, J. of Evol. Economics 10,
523 (2000).
[14] K. H. Schlag, J. of Econom. Theory 78, 130.
[15] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 95, 238701 (2005).
[16] Ch. S. Gokhale and A. Traulsen, Dyn. Games and Appl.
4, 468 (2014).
[17] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev.
E. 74, 011901 (2006).
[18] A. Dobrinevski and E. Frey, Phys. Rev. E 85, 051903
(2012).
[19] P. A. P. Moran, The Statistical Processes of Evolutionary
Theory (Clarendon, Oxford, 1962).
[20] M. A. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg,
Nature 428, 646 (2004).
[21] J. M. Smith, Evolution and the Theory of
Games(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1982).
[22] E. Seneta, Non-negative Matrices and Markov Chains
(Springer, NY, 2006).
[23] M. Khasin and M. I. Dykman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103,
068101 (2009).
[24] By virtue of the Perron-Frobenius theorem, λ and d˜ are
5both real and non-negative [22].
[25] This choice corresponds to the Matching Pennies game,
see J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of
Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1944).
[26] J. Nash, PNAS 36, 48 (1950).
[27] A. Trauslen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev.
E 85, 041901 (2012).
[28] L. Arnold, Random Dynamical Systems (Springer, NY,
2003).
[29] P. J. Thomas and B. Lindner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113,
254101 (2014).
[30] A. J. Black, A. Traulsen, and T. Galla, Phys. Rev. Lett.
109, 028101 (2012).
[31] The average absorption time for a specific initial state,
tabs(i, j), is proportional the corresponding entry in the
left maximal-eigenvalue eigenvector of the reduced ma-
trix Q˜. The proportionality coefficient can be found from
the dual orthonormality condition.
[32] We find a sharp contrast between the mean-filed dynam-
ics and the stochastic evolution for this particular value
of ω. The optimal value for the frequency (period) of
modulations could be different for other driving scheme
and/or other choice of the game payoffs.
[33] T. Maruyama and P. A. Fuerst, Genetics 111, 691 (1985).
[34] The relations between the exponent λT , mean absorption
(fixation) time [31], and dynamical properties of Floquet
states is an interesting issue. It can be explored, for exam-
ple, with a discrete-time generalization of the “optimal
path to exctintion” approach [35–37].
[35] M. I. Dykman, E. Mori, J. Ross, and P. M. Hunt, J.
Chem. Phys. 100, 5735 (1994).
[36] C. Escudero and J. A. Rodriguez, Phys. Rev. E 77,
011130 (2008).
[37] M. Assaf, A. Kamenev, and B. Meerson, Phys. Rev. E
78, 041123 (2008).
[38] S. S. Golden, V. M. Cassone, and A. Li Wang, Nat.
Struct. Mol. Biol. 14, 362 (2007); A. Sancar, Nat. Struct.
Mol. Biol. 15, 23 (2008).
[39] D. Vorberg, W. Wustmann, R. Ketzmerick, and A.
Eckardt, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 240405 (2013).
[40] J. Knebel, M. F. Weber, T. Kru¨ger, and E. Frey, Nature
Comm. 6, 6977 (2015).
Supplemental Material
SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN MATE
PREFERENCES
Stable time variations were found in the female fly-
catcher preferences or male forehead patch size that
resulted in late-breeding females preferring males with
larger patches [1]. It was explained by the fact that in
the beginning of the breeding season, large-patched males
allocate more resources to courting than to parental care
but change their habits to the opposite late in the season.
Seasonal variations were also found in fiddle crabs (female
preference to male claw size) [2], two-spotted goby (fe-
male preference to overall male size) [3], and sailfin mol-
lies (male preferences for two different kind of females)
[4].
MORAN PROCESS
Players A (males) and B (females) form two popula-
tions, each one of a fixed size N and with two available
strategies, s = {1, 2}. Payoffs are specified by four func-
tions, {ass′(t)} and {bs′s(t)}, s, s′ = {1, 2}. The average
payoff of the players using strategy s is
piAs (j, t) = as1(t)
j
N
+ as2(t)
(N − j)
N
, (3)
piBs (i, t) = bs1(t)
i
N
+ bs2(t)
(N − i)
N
. (4)
Payoffs determine the probabilities for a player to be cho-
sen for reproduction, e.g. for the male population,
PAs (i, j, t) =
1
N
· 1− w + wpi
A
s (j, t)
1− w + wp¯iA(i, j, t) , (5)
where p¯iA(i, j, t) = [ipiA1 (j, t) + (N − i)piA2 (j, t)]/N is the
average payoff of the males. The baseline fitness w ∈
[0, 1] is a tunable baseline fitness parameter determining
how the player’s chance to be chosen for reproduction
is related to player’s performance [5, 6]. When w = 0,
the probability to be chosen for reproduction does not
depend on player’s performance and is uniform across
the population.
After the choice has been made, another member of the
population is chosen completely randomly and replaced
with an offspring of the player chosen for reproduction,
i.e. with a player using the same strategy as its par-
ent [7]. This update mechanism is acting simultaneously
in both populations, A and B, such that a mating pair
produces two offspring, a male and a female, on every
round. Therefore, the size of the populations N remains
constant.
A single round can be considered as a one-step Markov
process, with transition rates, e.g. for population A, from
a state i to states i+ 1 and i− 1, are given by [6, 10]
T+A (i, j, t) =
1− w + wpiA1 (t)
1− w + wp¯iA
i
N
N − i
N
,
T−A (i, j, t) =
1− w + wpiA2 (t)
1− w + wp¯iA
N − i
N
i
N
. (6)
TRANSITION TENSOR
Here we describe the transition fourth-order tensor
Sm(i, j, i′, j′) in terms of the rates [T+,−A (i, j, t) and
T+,−B (i, j, t)] for populations A and B given by Eq. (4)
in the main text. The stochastic Moran process can be
expressed as a Markov chain [10]
6pm+1(i, j) =
[
1− T+A (i, j,m4t)− T−A (i, j,m4t)
] [
1− T+B (i, j,m4t)− T−B (i, j,m4t)
]
pm(i, j)
+T−B (i, j + 1,m4t)
[
1− T−A (i, j + 1,m4t)− T+A (i, j + 1,m4t)
]
pm(i, j + 1)
+T+B (i, j − 1,m4t)
[
1− T−A (i, j − 1,m4t)− T+A (i, j − 1,m4t)
]
pm(i, j − 1)
+T−A (i+ 1, j,m4t)
[
1− T−B (i+ 1, j,m4t)− T+B (i+ 1, j,m4t)
]
pm(i+ 1, j)
+T+A (i− 1, j,m4t)
[
1− T−B (i− 1, j,m4t)− T+B (i− 1, j,m4t)
]
pm(i− 1, j)
+T−A (i+ 1, j + 1,m4t)T−B (i+ 1, j + 1,m4t)pm(i+ 1, j + 1)
+T+A (i− 1, j + 1,m4t)T−B (i− 1, j + 1,m4t)pm(i− 1, j + 1)
+T−A (i+ 1, j − 1,m4t)T+B (i+ 1, j − 1,m4t)pm(i+ 1, j − 1)
+T+A (i− 1, j − 1,m4t)T+B (i− 1, j − 1,m4t)pm(i− 1, j − 1). (7)
The above equation can be recast into
pm+1(i, j) =
∑
i′,j′
Sm(i, j, i′, j′)pm(i′, j′), (8)
where the fourth-order tensor Sm(i, j, i′, j′) is given by,
Sm(i, j, i′, j′) =
[
1− T+A (i′, j′,m4t)− T−A (i′, j′,m4t)
] [
1− T+B (i′, j′,m4t)− T−B (i′, j′,m4t)
]
δi′,i δj′,j
+T−B (i
′, j′,m4t) [1− T−A (i′, j′,m4t)− T+A (i′, j′,m4t)] δi′,i δj′,j+1
+T+B (i
′, j′,m4t) [1− T−A (i′, j′,m4t)− T+A (i′, j′,m4t)] δi′,i δj′,j−1
+T−A (i
′, j′,m4t) [1− T−B (i′, j′,m4t)− T+B (i′, j′,m4t)] δi′,i+1 δj′,j
+T+A (i
′, j′,m4t) [1− T−B (i′, j′,m4t)− T+B (i′, j′,m4t)] δi′,i−1 δj′,j
+T−A (i
′, j′,m4t)T−B (i′, j′,m4t)δi′,i+1 δj′,j+1
+T+A (i
′, j′,m4t)T−B (i′, j′,m4t)δi′,i−1 δj′,j+1
+T−A (i
′, j′,m4t)T+B (i′, j′,m4t)δi′,i+1 δj′,j−1
+T+A (i
′, j′,m4t)T+B (i′, j′,m4t)δi′,i−1 δj′,j−1. (9)
Above i = 0, · · · , N , j = 0, · · · , N , i′ = 0, · · · , N , and
j′ = 0, · · · , N . Using the bijection k = (N − 1)j + i and
l = (N − 1)j′ + i′, we obtain the required matrix form,
see Eq. (7) in the main text.
ADJUSTED REPLICATOR EQUATIONS
In the continuous limit N → ∞, the dynamics of the
variables x = i/N and y = j/N is defined by the adjusted
replicator equations [8, 11],
x˙ = [1− x][∆A(t)− ΣA(t)y] 1
Γ + p¯iA(x, y, t)
, (10)
y˙ = [1− y][∆B(t)− ΣB(t)x] 1
Γ + p¯iB(x, y, t)
, (11)
where ∆C = c12−c22, ΣC = c11+c22−c12−c21, Γ = 1−ww ,
and C = {A,B}. p¯iA(x, y, t) [p¯iB(x, y, t)] is the averaged
(over the population) payoff of the males [females].
THE LIFETIME OF A METASTABLE STATE
The lifetime of the state d(t) can be estimated with
the largest eigenvalue λT , 0 < λT < 1, of the ma-
trix U˜r(T ). To compare it with lifetimes of stationary
metastable states, we introduce the mean single-round
exponent, λ¯T = λ
1/M
T and define the mean lifetime as
tlife = 1/(1− λ¯T ). Figure 1 shows the dependence of tlife
on the strength of modulations.
SIMULATIONS
The preconditioned stochastic sampling was performed
by launching trajectories from random initial points, uni-
formly distributed on the N − 1 × N − 1 grid and then
sampling the pdf with only those trajectories which re-
mained unabsorbed after 10 ·N2 rounds.
For N = 200 the diagonalization of the 39 601×39 601
7FIG. 5: (color online) The lifetime tlife as a function of the
modulation strength f , for the population size N = 50 (©),
100 (), and 200 (4). Other parameters are as in Fig. 2 in
the main text.
matrix Q˜T was performed on the cluster of the MPIPKS
(Dresden) and Leibniz-Rechenzentrum (Mu¨nchen). The
stochastic sampling was performed on a GPU cluster con-
sisting of twelve TESLA K20XM cards. That allowed us
to obtain 5 · 108 realizations for each set of parameters.
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